Student Seminar Series - April 26, 2005
University of Minnesota
School of Statistics
College of Liberal Arts
Optimal
Bidding Strategies for a Non-durable Consumer Good
Barb Bennie
Tuesday, April 26, 2005
2:00 PM, 300
Ford Hall
Minneapolis, East Bank Campus
Refreshments at 1:30 PM
300 Ford Hall
Abstract
Agents in an economy compete via bidding to purchase a
non-durable consumer good (e.g. pizza) with money in a series of
discrete stages.
The amount of good available in each stage is cyclic. At the end of
each stage of bidding, the agents receive an amount of
good that is proportional to their bids, and the total money spent on
the good is recirculated to the agents in some symmetric way.
There is a tension within the economy for each agent to buy some good
in the current stage, but save some money for purchasing in the
future. The goal of this research is to find bidding strategies for the
agents that are optimal for various formulations of this game.